Introduction
Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, regularly engaging in cooperate acts with both related and unrelated individuals. Cooperation in humans has played a fundamental role in the success of our species, yielding unprecedented collective action and a capacity to transmit information through vast social networks, which has provided humans with a key selective advantage that has enabled population growth into even boreal climates (Boyd et al. 2011 ). In particular, such cooperative tendencies have been vital to our cultural development, facilitating our ability to accumulate complex traits and knowledge over time (cumulative culture), a process that is widely believed to underpin humanity's extraordinary biological success. Given the selective advantage wide-scale cooperation has conferred to our species, it is important to address why this capability may have evolved and the processes that may underpin it. In this entry, we consider one mechanism that may be essential to maintaining the success of cooperation, inequity aversion.
When considering behaviors, evolutionary scientists typically focus on two features: its function, or why it evolved, and the mechanism(s) by which it operates. Regarding the first of these, the evolutionary pathway that leads to cooperation is relatively well understood. It is typically accounted for by one of the three theories: kin selection, reciprocity, or mutualism. The kin selection account of cooperation is that cooperation can evolve when cooperative acts provide a fitness advantage to related individuals, despite a cost to helper organisms. The account of cooperation that involves direct reciprocity indicates that cooperation can arise when the short-term net losses are outweighed by the long-term benefits of cooperative interactions, often with specific partners. Finally, mutualism describes cooperation that can result in greater immediate payoffs resulting from working together as compared to working alone, without necessarily requiring future interaction. Central to all theories of cooperation is the cost-benefit ratio resulting from collaboration; cooperation requires average individual inclusive fitness to be increased, directly or indirectly, when cooperating with genetically similar individuals. Herein lies the challenge; for cooperation to evolve, it must provide more benefit than the actor pays in costs.
One way in which this might be done is through a sense of "fairness," or more precisely, an ability to recognize inequitable outcomes (see Brosnan 2011 , for further discussion of the link between inequity aversion and fairness). Specifically, sensitivity to inequity allows organisms to identify when a partner unduly benefits from collaborative interactions versus when partners mutually and fairly benefit. Recognizing when payoffs are equitable or inequitable can inform actors whether it is beneficial to engage in future collaboration or whether it is time to find a new cooperative partner. Indeed, one advantage of having a sense of inequity is that it might allow individuals, in some cooperative contexts, to recognize when they are being cheated by receiving less than they should (rather than receiving nothing at all; Brosnan and Bshary 2016) .
In the past few decades, there has been increasing empirical and theoretical attention on whether species recognize inequitable outcomes and how this is (or is not) related to species' cooperative tendencies. Empirically, researchers have established that many species are averse to inequitable payoffs in at least some contexts. This is described by the term "inequity aversion," a negative response to an unequal payoff to oneself, relative to others that can take the form of disadvantageous inequity aversion -a response to receiving less than others -or advantageous inequity, a response to receiving more than others (Brosnan 2006) . Theoretically, inequity aversion has been hypothesized to constitute one of the mechanisms by which cooperation can be maintained because it allows individuals to judge the value of their partners. Specifically, individuals can judge when they should (i) discontinue interactions with partners that take more than their share of the benefits of cooperation, (ii) replace such unfair partners with more equitable partners, (iii) encourage future interactions with valuable partners by distributing rewards in an equitable manner, and/or (iv) manage their reputation as a fair partner (e.g., by rejecting unequal but beneficial gains). Such strategies may play an important role in long-term cooperative actions (Brosnan 2011) , particularly when unrelated individuals stand to benefit from reciprocity and mutualism. Of course, not all of these benefits will appear in every species, and such behavior could evolve without individuals understanding the function; all that is needed is an evolved negative response to inequitable outcomes that causes individuals to seek out other partners.
In this entry, we take an explicitly evolutionary approach to explore how inequity aversion evolved as an adaption to meet particular environmental and social challenges. We first provide background on the study of inequity aversion in humans, following which we discuss the empirical evidence for inequity aversion in nonhuman species and, in particular, nonhuman primates. We then consider what this tells us about the phylogenetic trajectory of the inequity response. These results indicate that inequity aversion and cooperation coevolved, supporting the argument that inequity aversion is a mechanism to promote successful cooperation. Following this evolutionary view, we look at the degree to which inequity may impact cooperation between individual organisms. Inequity does lead to a breakdown in cooperation, again indicating the degree to which inequity responses are important in cooperation. We end with a consideration of how inequity is related to the human sense of fairness and to what degree studying responses to inequity in nonhuman species can help us understand the evolution of our sense of fairness.
The Study of Inequity Aversion in Humans
One challenge to an evolutionary approach to fairness is that fairness is a social ideal, and it is impossible to study ideals in nonverbal species. Therefore, in order to study this empirically, researchers have operationalized the sense of fairness as an ability to recognize disadvantageous and advantageous outcomes relative to those of a partner. One way researchers have empirically approached this question has been to examine the choices participants make when they are faced with allocating resources between themselves and a partner. Various scenarios, or "games," borrowed from the field of economics have been used to investigate the contexts in which humans care about equity. In one such game, called the "dictator game," a resource (i.e., money) is provisioned to an individual (the proposer) who decides how to divide it between themselves and a "recipient." In the dictator game, the recipient plays a passive role and has no option to influence the proposer's offer. Thus, the proposer can share resources at a cost (reduce advantageous inequity or even create disadvantageous inequity) or monopolize resources (maximize advantageous inequity). As the partner does not have a say in the distribution, a situation is created in which selfish behavior pays. This setup has been informative for establishing whether humans make "fair" offers when there is no opportunity for a partner to encourage fairness by reciprocity or recourse.
Dictator games have been played with children and adults of different societies, yielding some interesting developmental and cultural differences. In children, younger individuals act selfishly, keeping all, or the majority, of rewards (e.g., Gummerum et al. 2010) . This picture begins to change at around the age of 5, with a developmental shift toward acting more fairly, and children will often begin to distribute the rewards equally. This, and similar research, supports the proposition that children begin life acting in a rather selfcentered manner before more egalitarian tendencies begin to set in at around 5-7 years of age. Turning to adults, the typical amount allotted to a partner in dictator games averages around 20% (Forsythe et al. 1994) suggesting that, when a cost is involved and repercussions are absent, humans do not maximize their absolute gains but they are also not perfectly fair, either; instead, they make non-zero but nonetheless inequitable offers that favor themselves.
Comparing the dictator game to the "ultimatum" game shows that contextual features can influence how fairly humans act toward others. The ultimatum game mirrors the dictator game, with the exception that the recipient can reject the proposed reward allocation, in which case both players receive nothing. This is both a form of punishment and an inequity response (although rejecting means that the recipient now ends up with absolutely less than they could have had, the outcome is relatively equal). In this context, average offers made in Western adults increase to approximately 30-40% (Camerer and Thaler 1995) . This indicates that when proposers can lose resources, proposals become more equitable, albeit typically still not equal. The ultimatum game mimics situations in which individuals, at a cost, can defect from partners that cheat or unduly benefit, a situation that encourages equity. That human fairness judgments are linked to contextual and social factors is further highlighted by cross-cultural studies. Interestingly, economic games, such as the dictator and ultimatum games, played with different societies, reveal large between-group variations in the proposals humans make (Henrich et al. 2004) . Such findings suggest that the human notion of fairness is very sensitive to differences in social and ecological environment as well. In particular, as is expected if the hypothesized link between fairness and cooperation is correct, more generous offers are proposed in societies that rely heavily on cooperation and trade (Henrich et al. 2004) .
Researchers have also made use of the "inequity game" to explore humans' reactions to inequitable outcomes. In this game, two participants take the role of the "actor" and "recipient" and the experimenter provisions either equitable or inequitable rewards. The actor then makes a decision of whether to accept or reject the reward distribution, the latter of which results in both participants receiving nothing. By including rewards that benefit and disadvantage actors relative to the partner, investigators can establish whether subjects may be averse to advantageous, disadvantageous, or both forms of inequity. The inequity game was recently employed in a large-scale study encompassing seven different societies and over 800 pairs of children, finding that children in all populations tested rejected disadvantageous rewards. Disadvantageous inequity aversion appeared around the age of 4 but with variation in the age of onset across the populations (Blake et al. 2015) . Rejection of advantageous rewards, in contrast, occurred only in some societies and at a later age. Importantly, such findings have helped to disentangle advantageous from disadvantageous inequity and emphasize that a self-serving bias to avoid disadvantageous outcomes appears to be a universal human trait, whereas aversion to advantageous outcomes appears to be influenced by society and culture.
Researchers have hypothesized that inequity responses evolved in tandem with cooperation (Brosnan 2006 (Brosnan , 2011 Fehr and Schmidt 1999) . In particular, inequity is purported to act as a mechanism to compare one's own outcome to those of others following collaborative effort. Experimental support for this has been emerging in the nonhuman literature (discussed below) but several lines of evidence link fairness decisions to cooperation in the human literature as well, often indicting that cooperation strengthens subjects' motivations for fair payoffs.
Investigators have exposed children to experimental cooperation tasks very similar to those run with nonhuman primates, allowing some direct comparisons to be made. In one such example, Warneken et al. (2011) set 3-year-old children the task of working together to gain otherwise unavailable rewards that were either separated into two distributed piles, and thus could not be easily monopolized by one child, or were clumped into a single pile that could be easily monopolized. Importantly, children as young as 3 years of age mostly split the resources evenly in the clumped resource condition, suggesting children knew what was "fair." This result contrasts with contexts that do not require children to engage in joint action, which reveal more selfish intentions in children of this age (e.g., in the dictator game: Gummerum et al. 2010 ). If we compare this to cooperative studies with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), we find high levels of resource monopolization and a break down in collaboration in chimpanzees, but not children (Hare et al. 2007 ).
Bonobos (Pan paniscus), argued to be more socially tolerant than chimpanzees, tested on this paradigm behaved more similarly to humans, outperforming chimpanzees in the clumped resource condition. That being said, more recently, chimpanzees have been shown to share food more often and show greater tolerance in this context than bonobos, leaving open the question of how our closest evolutionary ancestors shared food (Jaeggi et al. 2010) . Nevertheless, such findings linking tolerance and cooperation have led researchers to hypothesize that social tolerance over resources plays an important role in mediating cooperation and that the low-tolerance levels observed in some species is a major constraint on their cooperative tendencies. Thus, ensuring equity, either actively by sharing or through high social tolerance for co-feeding, may be a key factor in sustaining collaboration, whereas disadvantageous inequity aversion, coupled with competitive tendencies, may limit such opportunities. This supports the prediction that cooperation may be maintained over the long term by distributing rewards in an equitable manner or choosing to work with partners who do so.
Similar cooperation studies show that by the age of 3, children will correct resource inequity after working together, sharing resources to a greater extent after such collaboration than when working in parallel or when simply gifted with resources (Hamann et al. 2011) . Children are also are more likely to share rewards evenly with those who collaborate than with free riders (Melis et al. 2013 ). These findings suggest that children engage in equitable reward distribution based on collaboration and work effort (equity) rather than simply ensuring equality irrespective of collaboration. Comparative work with chimpanzees shows no such flexible sharing according to whether others collaborate or not, indicating a potentially important species difference (Hamann et al. 2011) . In addition to correcting resource inequities following cooperation, humans also anticipate who may serve as good collaborators. For example, at 15 months of age, children already select partners that are fair over unfair ones (Burns and Sommerville 2014) . By adulthood, cooperative partners are selected according to how generous they are, they will act more generously when observed and will even compete to be more generous than each other when future cooperation can lead to personal gain (Barclay and Willer 2007) . Of course, individuals need not always be aware of the future benefit of selecting fair over unfair partners (e.g., 15 month olds almost certainly do not understand this) nor need they understand how such strategies work. Instead, attraction to or a preference for fair or generous partners (in combination with a preference to end unfair cooperative relationships) could maintain selectivity for partners that are likely to provide equal or beneficial gains in future collaborations.
The study of inequity aversion in humans has taken many forms, using tasks, joint activities, games, and vignettes, with various dependent measures ranging from self-reports or emotional reactions to active resource allocations and the rejection of absolute gains if they lead to relative inequality. Key findings have emerged that provide insight into which facets of fairness children may be biologically predisposed to pay attention to and which may require some social experience and culture. Concerning the former, that children from an early age (around 3-4 years old), and from various cultures, respond to disadvantageous inequity across multiple experimental contexts, suggests that disadvantageous inequity aversion is a robust response; humans, it seems, do not like to receive less than partners and are willing to pay a price to avoid such circumstances. On the other hand, an aversion to receiving more than partners -advantageous inequity -follows a different developmental trajectory, appearing later in development (around the age of 8 in Western populations) and is subject to strong cultural influence (Blake et al. 2015) . Equity choices also depend upon contextual factors, suggesting that fair behavior is not employed indiscriminately. Rather, sharing depends upon factors such as who the partner is and how much effort they devoted to a task (cooperation) and whether the partner can influence payoffs (e.g., ultimatum games) or not (e.g., dictator games). Such selectivity begins with choosing with whom we prefer to interact or cooperate. This indicates that our treatment by others (e.g., fair or unfair) influences whether we choose to engage with them or select someone else with whom to work.
The Study of Inequity Aversion in Nonhumans
Humans show strong responses to inequity, but what about other species? Evidence accumulated over the past few decades shows that some other species react negatively to receiving a less desirable outcome than their partners. In a typical test of inequity aversion in nonhuman species, two partnered individuals each complete a task to receive a reward. The task is completed sequentially -with each individual taking turnsand the rewards provisioned to each partner are either the same (equity condition) or different (inequity condition). If subjects are inequity averse, a pronounced reaction should occur in the inequity condition relative to the equity condition. While different tasks have been used to study inequity aversion (and in some cases, no task at all), the majority of studies have employed an exchange paradigm in which subjects take, and then return, an object ("token") to the experimenter for a food reward, essentially bartering it. This method was originally conceived by Brosnan and de Waal (2003) and applied to brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella). The authors documented higher levels of rejection (unwillingness to exchange a token or consume a reward) in individuals that were offered cucumber (a less preferred food reward) following their partner's receipt of grape (a favored food) as compared to their rejection rate in the baseline equity condition, in which both exchanged for cucumbers. The authors interpreted this result as reflecting a response to inequitable outcomes based on social comparison, that is, "inequity" based on the reward disparity between oneself and others, rather than a reaction to personally observed or experienced reward differences.
This interpretation did not go unchallenged. Two alternative explanations to the authors' conclusion were based on nonsocial responses to unequal "pay." First was "food frustration effects" in which the mere presence of a better reward could enhance rejections if the favored food was present in the inequity, but not in the equity, condition. The second challenge was the potential frustration brought on by a violation of an expectation to receive a favored, and previously experienced, food when the subject instead receives a less preferred food (i.e., an expectation based on past reward history). More recent studies of inequity, however, have controlled for these alternative explanations by ensuring that both favored and non-preferred foods are visible in all study conditions and by the inclusion of controls for potential frustration, typically with a condition in which subjects are shown a favored food before offering a less preferred food, and by randomizing the order in which conditions are presented. Even with these controls, social comparison, or inequity aversion, still occurs. This suggests that refusals are not simply (or only) due to seeing better rewards or any potential frustration caused by expecting a better reward than is received.
Brosnan and de Waal's initial study of inequity aversion in capuchin monkeys paved the way for new research exploring such capabilities across the primate order and, in a recently emerging trend, non-primate species. At least 30 studies have now been published, and these find substantial variation across species and contexts (see Brosnan and de Waal (2014) for a table including all studies published to that date). Here we briefly summarize this research, focusing on what species show a response to social inequity and, where possible, the influence of procedural and contextual variables on the manifestation of the inequity response.
The Phylogeny of Inequity Aversion
Among the great apes, chimpanzees are the most studied species. Chimpanzees generally show some degree of inequity aversion, much like the brown capuchin monkeys (see Brosnan and de Waal 2014; Price and Brosnan 2012) . However, they are notable because their responses are subject to high levels of group and individual variation that has been linked to various social and personal factors, not always in consistent ways. Investigations using very similar protocols have shown that dominance, social affiliation, and gender can all influence inequity responses in some, but not all, situations. Brosnan and colleagues, for example, have documented a stronger response in dominant individuals when they were undercompensated relative to a lower-ranking partner, but this dominance effect was not found in other studies (see Price and Brosnan 2012 for a review of these data). Similarly, there have been cases of chimpanzees with close social ties (i.e., housed together for long periods) being less responsive to a partner being overcompensated as compared to chimpanzees that were housed together for much shorter periods, although again, there have also been studies in which no such variation was seen. Such inconsistencies have encouraged researchers to search for individual differences that may account for some of this variation. Personality, for example, was recently found to correlate with social inequity responses, although it seems likely that relationship quality, which influences which individuals will voluntarily pair together for the tasks themselves, affects their responses as well (Brosnan et al. 2015) .
Other factors not yet considered likely also underpin this variation. For example, the social configuration and tolerance of partnered animals may influence responses to inequity (reviewed in Price and Brosnan 2012), as could variation in subjects' daily food intake and any social change that may occur in the group at the time of testing. There may also be interactions between factors. For example, dominant individuals may show strong inequity responses simply because they are more satiated at the time of testing, through prior resource monopolization, relative to less dominant individuals. Satiation likely increases the likelihood of the costly behavior of forgoing an immediate, less preferred food in inequity conditions. Furthermore, dominants may be used to receiving the best foods from humans, strengthening potential inequity responses. Depending upon one's group, and indeed housing facility, dominant individuals' propensity to monopolize food could vary, with implications for the food refusal rates. One open question, then, is whether inequity aversion in the context of food rewards is an artifact of captivity, as forgoing an immediate reward incurs little cost where there is reliable, and sufficient, food provisioning. This question requires investigation in natural populations and could be examined by documenting participation levels in coordinated activities following equitable and inequitable gains, for instance, looking at whether coordinated hunt participation lowers following disadvantageous inequitable food returns and exploring how participation may interact with food scarcity. It will also be important to determine in which other contexts inequity may influence behavior in natural conditions, particularly outside of the context of food.
Turning to the other great apes, comparatively less work has been conducted on inequity aversion. We know nothing of gorillas' (Gorilla spp.) capabilities, except that they do not respond to inequity when rewards are "gifted" by the experimenter (i.e., in the absence of a task; see Brosnan and de Waal 2014) . However, no response in a free-feeding context is common across species. In every primate species in which inequity has been documented, subjects only respond negatively when the food rewards are received subsequent to completing some sort of task; when rewards are handed out "for free," the same subjects do not respond negatively even when they are unequal. We know little more about the other great apes, with only one published exchange study focusing on bonobos and two on orangutans (Bräuer et al. 2009; Brosnan et al. 2011 ). For bonobos, evidence points toward some presence of inequity aversion; however, as only five subjects have been tested, the results are inconclusive (Bräuer et al. 2009 ). The two studies that have examined whether orangutans respond to disadvantageous inequity document no such trend in socially housed orangutans (Bräuer et al. 2009; Brosnan et al. 2011) . This is interesting, should it hold, as orangutans are among the least social primates, particularly in comparison to other great apes, and rarely cooperate in the wild. However, given this paucity of data in bonobos and gorillas, it is difficult to determine how inequity responses may have evolved among the apes.
Experimental studies of inequity have also focused on monkeys, including macaques (Macaca ssp.), capuchins (Cebus ssp.), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri ssp.), owl monkeys (Aotus spp.), marmosets (Callithrix spp.), and tamarins (Saguinus oedipus; see Brosnan and de Waal 2014 for a review of this literature, including citations for studies on each species). Capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees, have been highly studied, and also like chimpanzees, show variation in their responses, with some studies finding evidence of inequity aversion while others have not. Interestingly, among the other New World monkeys that have been tested (common marmosets, owl monkeys, squirrel monkeys, and tamarins), no species has been shown to respond to disadvantageous inequity. However, much like in the great apes, the focus primarily on one species -capuchinswith very little data available concerning other New World monkeys makes it premature to conclude that other New World species lack a response to inequity, particularly given the variation in individuals' responses in the best studied species. The situation is even less clear in Old World monkeys, for which only macaques have been tested. Both species tested thus far (rhesus and long-tailed macaques) do respond negatively to social contrast. More recently, researchers have studied non-primate species, and initial data indicate that domestic dogs, rats, and corvids respond to the presence of, or the potential for, inequity (reviewed in Brosnan and de Waal 2014) .
Considering variability within species, one factor proposed to explain such discrepancies, at least in part, is the experimental procedures employed. The combination of work effort provided by a task and subject's proximity to their partner appear to be important for the expression of inequity aversion, with studies that have distant partners and/or no task generally reporting a lack of a response to inequity, even in species and groups that show inequity in other contexts (Brosnan and de Waal 2014) . Other factors, such as the relative value of the rewards may also impact inequity aversion; for instance, the preference discrepancy between some food pairings (e.g., pine nuts versus sunflower seeds) may differ to those used in other studies (e.g., cucumber versus grape). While the relative value of foods is always established within studies, these values still differ between studies, and recent research in capuchins shows that relative food values strongly impact inequity responses (Talbot et al. 2017) . Finally, social and individual differences impact inequity aversion in chimpanzees, which may also play a role in other species' unfairness judgments. For example, the relatedness of subjects and partners are rarely reported but could have a profound effect on whether animals are inequity averse or not. Individuals' propensity to use social over personal information may also determine responses to inequity. Many animals collect both kinds of information but are reported to prioritize personal over social information (Rieucau and Giraldeau 2011) , meaning that animals may not always attend to social contrasts.
Considering the variability across species, what does this phylogenetic dispersal of inequity aversion tell us about the evolution of disadvantageous inequity aversion? Most apparent is the inconsistent distribution of disadvantageous inequity aversion across the primate order and its presence in diverse taxa both within the primates and beyond (e.g., corvids and rats). From this, it is evident that convergent evolution is at play (Brosnan 2011) ; disadvantageous inequity has evolved independently in various organisms, likely in response to similar ecological and/or social niches. Such pressures have been hypothesized to include species' sociality and degree of cooperation with non-kin. Sociality alone does not appear critical here as some gregarious species, living in large social groups, are nonetheless insensitive to inequity (e.g., squirrel monkeys). Instead, recent theory has favored a link between inequity aversion and cooperation with non-kin; of course, regular exposure to non-kin relates to species sociality/social structure, but the cooperation component seems to be important. Wild chimpanzees engage in coordinated hunts, territory defense, and coalitions, suggesting cooperation or at least behavioral coordination between group members. Likewise, the social behavior of capuchins and macaques hints at cooperation with non-kin. A number of experimental studies also show a degree of cooperation in these species, and even that inequitable outcomes will disrupt cooperation, providing further evidence for this link.
In considering the relationship between inequity aversion and cooperation, factors that complicate the picture should be noted. First, cooperation between non-kin alone does not appear sufficient for the emergence of inequity aversion. Cooperative breeders (marmosets and tamarins), species in which both parents and, sometimes, older offspring work together to raise infants, show no reaction to inequity. This may be due to the high level of interdependence between males and females that renders a negative response to inequitable outcomes more costly than beneficial (i.e., the cost of finding a new mate, and risking losing one's current reproductive investment, is higher than the cost of inequity in most contexts; Brosnan 2011). One caveat here is whether cooperative breeders may be socially tolerant in some, but not other, situations. Cooperative breeders, for example, may be sensitive to inequitable contributions in work effort but tolerant of inequitable food returns. Second, as many studies have been conducted in highly controlled laboratory contexts, the extent to which the apparent sensitivity to inequitable outcomes generalizes to the natural environment remains unknown. Third, given the large variation in the inequity response documented within those species most studied (chimpanzees and capuchins), caution must be used when assuming an absence of inequity aversion in species based on just one or two studies. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that ecologically valid measurements of cooperation in natural populations could have more relevance to interpreting the possible relationship between inequity aversion and cooperation than those derived from captive studies, which may be more artificial. This is highlighted by orangutans, a semi-solitary species, that in two independent studies did not respond to inequity nor do they show high cooperative tendencies in the wild, yet they will work together to gain a reward in a captive setting, cooperating much like chimpanzees and capuchins (Chalmeau et al. 1997) .
Overall, while it is currently the best-supported hypothesis, additional data are required to test the hypothesis that inequity aversion and cooperation coevolved. In particular, contrasts between closely related species known to cooperate with non-kin in the wild and those that do not, and social versus solitary species, would be useful in this regard. Another means to examine the link between cooperation and inequity aversion has been to establish whether inequitable outcomes directly influence the success of cooperation. To do so requires studies in which resource distributions can be manipulated or controlled; thus, while ecological valid measurements in the wild are important, the available evidence derived from controlled experimental tests of cooperation must also be considered.
The Influence of Inequity on Cooperation in Nonhumans
As discussed above, inequity aversion is hypothesized to help maintain cooperation by enabling organisms to do one or more of the following: (i) disengage from collaborating with those from whom they receive unfair returns, (ii) encourage more equitable future gains by choosing equitable partners, (iii) encourage future cooperation by distributing rewards in an equitable manner, and (iv) manage their reputation as a fair partner by rejecting unequal but beneficial gains. We have previously described how humans readily distribute rewards equitably following collaboration, select fair or generous partners, and will sometimes reject advantageous inequitable rewards. In this section, we consider whether inequity aversion constitutes a key mechanism supporting long-term cooperation in nonhumans by focusing on each of these predictions.
Studies of inequity aversion show that some individuals are less likely to participate in tasks when they receive unfavorable outcomes relative to a social partner. Inequity tasks, however, do not require cooperation between partners, which is a key component of this hypothesis. As a result, additional work has been done focusing explicitly on cooperation and reciprocity. In one such study, Brosnan et al. (2006) designed methods to directly test the assumption that unequal rewards influence levels of cooperation. Pairs of capuchins could perform a joint action (pull in a counterweighted tray) to gain rewards that were either equitable or inequitable. Key to this study was that participants, who were co-housed in the same enclosure, had to decide who worked for each reward. Thus, conflict could arise over the unequal resources. The authors found that when a dominant partner "unfairly" benefited by monopolizing the better reward, cooperation tended to break down. Indeed, cooperation rates when partners took turns in gaining the better reward were two to three times higher than when dominants monopolized the better outcomes, and cooperation with unfair partners broke down even in control tests in which rewards were equal. What this research suggests is that capuchins will cooperate over long periods even when short-term rewards are unequal as long as each partner is willing to "play fair" over the long term, yielding (roughly) equitable gains to both partners overall.
Similar findings have been documented in chimpanzees; they select partners based on their previous history of tolerant sharing (Melis et al. 2006) , reduce their cooperation when rewards can be monopolized by dominant individuals (Hare et al. 2007) , and, when not cooperating with kin, prefer to work with partners of similar rank, who are presumably more socially tolerant partners (Suchak et al. 2014) . These findings indicate that some primates remedy inequity though partner selectivity, that is, by not working collaboratively when resources are or can be monopolized and/or by taking turns gaining the beneficial but inequitable outcome of collaboration. Thus, there is some support for the predictions that inequity aversion may result in (i) leaving collaborators that take more than their share, (ii) using partner choice to manage future gains, and possibly even (iii) distributing rewards in an equitable manner to promote cooperation between individuals (i.e., capuchins taking turns to gain the best reward).
The last prediction indicates that inequity aversion may aid cooperation when individuals reject inequitable, but beneficial, outcomes (i.e., advantageous inequity aversion), perhaps encouraging future reciprocity or gaining a good reputation to attract future partners by establishing oneself as a fair partner. Interestingly, while in no study to date have monkeys minded options that reward themselves more than a partner, one study documented chimpanzees rejecting a preferred food when a partner received a non-preferred food (i.e., advantageous inequity aversion), albeit at a much lower rate than they rejected a less preferred food when a partner received a more preferred food (reviewed in Brosnan and de Waal 2014) .
Researchers have also tested nonhuman primates on the ultimatum game. As in the human ultimatum game described above, two individuals are assigned the "proposer" and "responder" roles. The proposer offers some of the resources to the responder, who can accept the offer, in which case each receives the rewards set out by the proposer, or reject the offer, in which case neither receives anything. Interestingly, as would be predicted by game theory, chimpanzees appear to accept any non-zero reward offers, suggesting they are rational maximizers (Jensen et al. 2007; Proctor et al. 2013) . This is unlike humans, who will reject offers below around 20% of the endowment. Chimpanzee proposers, on the other hand, make both fair (Proctor et al. 2013 ) and selfish offers (Jensen et al. 2007 ). In one study, proposers did not make the fair offer to their partners (Jensen et al. 2007 ); however, these chimpanzees also showed the costly behavior of delivering zero rewards to their partner, which had high rejection rates (44%), despite the availability of a second self-serving option that was only rejected by their partners 14% of the time. This, coupled with responders' rejection of zero offers on only 44% of trials, suggests that the chimpanzees only had a limited understanding of this task. In a more recent version, chimpanzees did prefer fair offers in the ultimatum game more so than in a preference test that was similar to a dictator game (Proctor et al. 2013 ). Key to this study was that fair reward options were favored only when partner chimpanzees had recourse to reject offers (i.e., the ultimatum condition), whereas selfish offers were favored when partners had no such ability (i.e., the dictator analogue), suggesting that the chimpanzees understood the procedure. Indeed, the lack of refusals by the responder may be logical in a repeated game with a known partner; rather than rejecting and ending the relationship, chimpanzees could protest and encourage the proposers to choose the more equal outcome. Therefore, even though the recipient will receive less on a few occasions, overall it is worth their while to continue the interaction (Proctor et al. 2013) .
Further indication that chimpanzees may be sensitive to gaining more than conspecifics is a finding that chimpanzees, in a group situation, counterintuitively opt to follow the low-paying behavior of a dominant chimpanzee, despite the presence of a better-paying alternative (Hopper et al. 2011) . The authors interpreted this as chimpanzees "conformity" to the low-paying behavior of the dominant chimpanzee (Hopper et al. 2011 ). An alternative explanation is that the selection of the low-paying behavior could be due to an aversion to advantageous inequity: perhaps the costs of receiving more than the model were too high to make it worthwhile to use the better option.
Research over the past two decades highlights the link between cooperation and inequity aversion. Further research is required to tease apart in which situations primates are indifferent versus being sensitive to others' payoffs and how this is mediated by opportunities to cooperate, reciprocate rewards, and, in some cases, punish others or manage one's reputation. Nonetheless, several studies now support the hypotheses that primates manage cooperation by leaving unfair collaborations and by being selective about which partners they choose. Less clear is whether nonhuman primates actively distribute rewards fairly (as could be the case of capuchins taking turns to gain the best reward) and, related to this, the degree to which any nonhuman species routinely shows refusal of unfair but beneficial personal gains. These qualities might constitute notable species differences between humans and other primates, as may other cognitive abilities (i.e., inhibiting one's desire to accept the better reward or planning for future interactions).
The Evolution of Fairness
Inequity aversion has been found in diverse species, including rats, dogs and wolves, some birds, and primates. The comparative literature has provided important insights into the evolution of the human sense of fairness. Knowing that inequity aversion has evolved in these diverse taxa indicates that convergence, rather than evolution through common descent, has been at play. Researchers have also now established that a sense of fairness can take different forms, and while disadvantageous inequity appears more widespread across taxa, advantageous inequity aversion is extremely rare. Indeed, even among humans, disadvantageous inequity aversion appears to be both more widespread and to develop at an earlier age, indicating a strong biological influence. Species found to have both forms of inequity aversion come close to having the "complete" sense of fairness seen in humans. Of course, humans' sense of fairness entails other aspects that are likely not present in other species, such as explicit group norms of behavior. How humans' advanced sense of fairness, which requires advanced cognition and emotional control, arose during the course of our evolution remains a significant question for science. Nonetheless, one explanation consistent with the current evidence is that fairness coevolved with cooperation with non-kin, and functions to help individuals maintain beneficial cooperative relationships. It is clear that individuals benefit from leaving partnerships in which they routinely get less than the partner, but they may also benefit from declining an unfair advantage. By paying the short-term costs of rejecting an unfairly advantageous outcome, individuals signal to their partner (and potentially to others) that they value the partner. If they can ameliorate their partner's frustration, the long-term relationship can continue (see Brosnan and de Waal 2014) . Humans, with our exceptional abilities at delay of gratification and planning for the future, inhibition, and understanding of others' thoughts and feelings (i.e., theory of mind), were able to take these roots and develop the full-blow sense of fairness seen in humans today.
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